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NOTE
INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL PUBLISHING
AND TERRITORIAL COPYRIGHT: IS THE
EUROPEAN UNION LETTING
INFRINGERS SLIP THROUGH ITS 'NETS?"
Digital publishing, the process of distributing works of
authorship on computer networks, has drawn mixed reactions
in the traditional media it currently supplements and may one
day replace. Commentators and journalists have both hailed
online circulation as the most important innovation since
Gutenberg's press1 and condemned computer networks as cat-
alysts of social disintegration.2 One statement about computer
networks meets unanimous acceptance: they comprise the
world's fastest growing and least regulated market.3 The di-
verse works circulated on the "nets" share two characteristics:
eligibility for copyright protection and special vulnerability to
piracy. Any idea capable of expression in written, graphic,
audio or video form can be circulated on a network, and any
1. Efforts such as Project Gutenberg, the Dante Project, and Online Book
Initiative aim to distribute public domain classics in digital form. PAUL GILSTER,
THE INTERNET NAVIGATOR 281-89 (2d ed., 1994). Michael Hart, the founder of
Project Gutenberg, has compared the cost reduction and resulting broader access to
the difference between hand-illuminated books and those mass-produced by the
first printing press. Id. at 282.
2. See John Schwartz, Toward a New Game Plan for the Internet in the
Workplace, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1995, (Business), at 25 (quoting Clifford Stoll,
author of Silicon Snake Oil: Second Thoughts on the Information Superhighway, as
worrying that the Internet distracts users from more useful and creative pursuits).
3. See, e.g., George L. Graff & Joel A. Goldberg, Computer Works Gain New
GATT Protection, NA'L L.J., Mar. 6, 1995, at C9 (calculating that American soft-
ware publishers lose $7 to $12 billion annually to unauthorized copying in the
global market, and that piracy of other intellectual property costs American rights
owners $60 billion per year); Paul Karon, Online Services Push the Envelope on
Copyright Issue, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1994, at D4 (quoting legal expert David
Nimmer as receiving requests from '[a] lot of people .. .asking [him] how they
can go to market without falling afoul of other copyrights.").
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expression posted on the net can be copied without payment or
permission by downloading to a disk in a user's computer.4
The resulting confusion assumes global proportions when intel-
lectual property is bought, sold, copied, and shared over inter-
national computer networks. While these exchanges take place
in a "virtual reality" unbounded by physical borders, they can
have serious consequences for real-world rights holders. These
problems are compounded by the fact that territorial copyright
has not yet been modified to accommodate the electronic trans-
mission of works in the transborder digital market.
A recent incident on the Internet, a network linking com-
puter networks worldwide, illustrates the gap between territo-
rial law and electronic publishing. Science fiction author Wil-
liam Gibson created a multimedia work entitled Agrippa (A
Book of the Dead) and retailed it on computer disks. He en-
crypted the story in a code that, like many computer viruses,
was designed to erase the onscreen text immediately after the
first reading.5 However, "Internauts" using Internet branches
in the United States and Great Britain soon cracked the code
and learned how to copy the disk so that the story remained
intact.6 They then distributed Gibson's copyrighted work to
electronic bulletin boards from which it could be downloaded at
no cost. The infringement's unprecedented speed and interna-
tional scope, combined with the network users' relative ano-
nymity, made locating the perpetrators virtually impossible.
Identifying every contributory infringer who downloaded the
work was similarly impractical. Indeed, attempting to separate
innocent infringers from the others would be futile without a
mechanism for determining if and when Gibson's copyright
notice had been removed.' A single infringement rapidly be-
4. See Thomas Dreier, Copyright Digitized: Philosophical Impacts and Practi-
cal Implications for Information Exchange in Digital Networks 4-5 (Mar. 31-Apr. 2,
1993) (unpublished paper presented at WIPO Worldwide Symposium on the Impact
of Digital Technology on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Harvard University,
on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
5. Gerald Jonas, The Disappearing $2,000 Book, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993,
§7 (Book Review), at 12. Accompanied by a set of limited edition etchings printed
in ink that wiped off the page when touched, the ephemeral work was offered to
collectors at a substantial price.
6. Testimony of David H. Rothman, Writer, Before the National Information
Infrastructure Task Force Working Group on Intellectual Property 2 (Nov. 18,
1993) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
7. Id. In his testimony, Mr. Rothman emphasized this point by displaying his
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came world-wide appropriation. Although Gibson did not pur-
sue this unauthorized international distribution, other rights
holders are beginning to take legal action to define their inter-
ests in electronic media.' These copyright owners recognize
the immense market awaiting their products and the danger
that infringers might reach that market first with illegal repro-
ductions of copyrighted works.
The majority of nations with access to computer networks
adhere to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works.9 The Berne Convention permits member
nations to implement their treaty obligations either by incorpo-
rating the Convention directly into national law or by promul-
gating national laws stating which provisions of the Conven-
tion will be recognized.' ° In countries adopting the treaty into
national law, additional implementing laws may be needed to
render Convention provisions applicable to the member
nation's citizens. 1 Residents rely on national laws that have
own pirated copy of Gibson's story and enquiring of the Working Group whether
they would respond by "unplug[ging] the Internet . . . or jail[ing] everyone with an
illegal copy of Agrippa?" Id.
8. Two pending New York lawsuits, one involving musical compositions ap-
pearing on computer bulletin boards and one dealing with newspaper articles re-
sold to online services, target the infringements made possible by new technolo-
gies. See Michael I. Rudell, Rights Problems Posed by Multimedia, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
1, 1994, at 3 (140 music publishers filed a complaint stating that the CompuServe
network knowingly permitted some 690 acts of unauthorized downloading); Rosa-
lind Resnick, Writers, Data Bases Do Battle, NATL L.J., Mar. 7, 1994, at 1 (jour-
nalists represented by the National Writers Union alleged copyright infringement
and breach of contract when their paychecks were printed with a waiver clause so
that endorsing the back meant signing away electronic publishing rights). See also
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (computer
bulletin board operator infringed magazine's copyrights in photographs when he
made unauthorized copies available to network subscribers).
9. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1886, revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, S. TREATY DOC. No. 27, 99th Cong. 2d
Sess. 37 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. Some eighty
nations are currently parties to the treaty, including all the members of the Euro-
pean Union (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy,
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain). Once conspicuous by
its absence, China has recently joined, as have several of the emerging Baltic
republics, and Russia is negotiating to become a member. See Jean-Frangois
Verstrynge, The Spring 1993 Horace S. Manges Lecture-The European
Commission's Direction on Copyright and Neighboring Rights: Toward the Regime
of the Twenty-First Century, 17 COLUmI.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 187, 198 (1993).
10. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITER-
ARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 131 (1987).
11. Exceptions to this rule are Berne Convention provisions whose plain mean-
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incorporated selected provisions of the Convention, rather than
on the Convention itself. 2 Given the importance of national
law in implementing the agreement, copyright in the European
Union remains primarily territorial with the Berne Convention
merely providing a minimum level of protection. 3
The Agrippa episode demonstrated that while computer
networks defy the Union's localized limits, application of terri-
torial copyright is necessary to ensure that authors will contin-
ue to offer their works on the digital market.14 At the very
least, applying the Berne minima to copyrighted materials
distributed on computer networks would place digital authors'
rights on par with those of their hard-copy counterparts. In so
doing, however, other considerations of global law and policy
must be weighed.
The Berne Convention functions in tandem not only with
national law, but with other multinational agreements. The
most notable of these is the treaty unifying the European Un-
ion. 5 This treaty's main goal is the creation of a common
market through which both tangible and intangible goods may
move freely." The tensions between the copyright monopoly
ing permits direct applications. Ricketson offers Article 2(1), which defines the
"literary and artistic works" eligible for protection, as an example of a provision
requiring no further action by the member nation. Id. Conversely, several articles
indicate the need for implementing domestic laws. See, e.g., Berne Convention,
supra note 9, art. 2bis(2), S. TREATY DOC. No. 27, at v, 828 U.N.T.S. at 229
(granting individual Berne countries the right to determine the scope of protection
for public addresses which are broadcasted).
12. While a private citizen might challenge a national law on the ground that
it fails to implement a Convention provision, this issue would be resolved in the
context of international obligations rather than that of individual rights.
RICKETSON, supra note 10, at 132.
13. Id. at 130 (noting that member states must grant their authors at least
the level of protection guaranteed by the Berne Convention, regardless of national
copyright provisions).
14. The incident had significant ramifications for copyright holders since the
European Union consumes slightly over one-third of all the information technology
and telecommunications services in the world. A study performed by the European
Information Technology Observatory (EITO) indicated that Western Europe's share
of the world telecommunications and information technology markets was thirty-
four percent, as compared to thirty-seven percent for the United States and six-
teen percent for Japan. Suzanne Perry, West Europe's IT Slump Shows Signs of
Bottoming Out, Reuter European Community Report, Mar. 8, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, REUEC File.
15. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
16. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]
arts. 3(a)-(c), 30-34.
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and the free flow of goods can translate into conflicts between
the European Union treaties, the Berne Convention, and mem-
ber nations' domestic law. Courts have struck an uneasy bal-
ance between authors' rights and market pressures. As a rule,
the European Union treaties cannot be construed to destroy
the national grant of intellectual property rights.17 Yet, once
granted, these rights cannot be exercised in a manner that
interferes with the European Union treaties."8 Once a court
finds an impermissible use of copyright, it may determine that
the treaties prevent the exercise of national rights-including
those stemming from the Berne Convention. 9 This fine line
between national grants and individual exercises of intellectual
property rights blurs quickly in the digital market. Compound-
ing the issue, neither the Berne Convention nor the national
laws have yet defined the substantive rights and procedural
rules applicable to computerized distribution.
Just as the law of land and chattels evolved to fit intangi-
ble "goods," traditional intellectual property law should also be
modified to regulate the distribution of these goods over com-
puter networks. This Note addresses some international di-
mensions of electronic publishing, focusing on the protection
accorded traditional works of authorship such as literary"
17. See Herman C. Jehoram et al., The Law of the E.E.C. and Copyright in 1
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 2[l][b], at 12 (Melville B. Nimmer
& Paul E. Geller eds., 1993).
18. See, e.g., Case T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R.
485, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance); Case T-70/89, British Broadcasting
Corp. v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 535, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance);
Case T-76/89, Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R.
575, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 775 (Ct. First Instance) (connected cases holding that na-
tional copyrights were subordinated to the EEC Treaty when the rights were ma-
nipulated to abuse a dominant market position). These so-called Magill cases are
currently on appeal to the European Court of Justice. A broad affirmation could
weaken authors' ability under national law to enjoin third parties' distribution of
pirated copies. See infra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
19. See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425 (as
a general principle, the EEC Treaty creates a legal system separate from national
law-a system by which member nations agree to be bound as a condition of entry
to the Union).
20. As in the United States, the term "literary works" has been expanded to
include computer software. Compare Council Directive 91/250 of 14 May 1991 on
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 1, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 44 (rec-
ognizing the human effort required to produce computer programs and granting
them copyright protection as literary works within the meaning of the Berne Con-
vention) [hereinafter Council Directive 91/250/EEC] with 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)
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and graphic works as well as musical compositions. Part I de-
scribes the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the
European Community directives governing telecommunica-
tions. Part II focuses on competition law, especially the circum-
stances under which an author "exhausts" rights in a work,
and contends that the nature of online works requires that
they be treated differently than physical goods under the com-
petition rules. This Part considers judicial views on exclusive
and collective licensing as representative of tensions between
technological advances and European Union legal tradition. In
light of this tradition, Part III discusses the need to redefine
key provisions of the Berne Convention for the digital era. Part
IV concludes that regulations for the nets should apply the
European Union treaties and the Berne Convention with a
view to keeping the electronic publishing market as fluid as
the free market of ideas it mirrors.
I. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EVOLVING TECHNOLOGICAL AND
LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURES
Like the European Union itself, computer networks cut
across physical, political, and cultural lines.2 Second only to
the United States as a consumer of telecommunications servic-
es and information technology,22 the European Union has rec-
ognized the potential benefits of computer networks for cultur-
al and economic unification. Thus, the Treaty of Maastricht
signed in 1992 called for the newly created European Union to
lay the groundwork for a pan-European telecommunications
"infrastructure. 23 In spite of this mandate, however, Europe-
an network use is not yet as extensive as that in the United
(defining literary works as those "expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or
numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects ...
in which they are embodied.").
21. Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, has spoken
optimistically on the nets' capability to bring Europeans of many backgrounds
together on common academic and cultural ground. Knit Your Own Superhighway,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993, at 101, 102.
22. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
23. Treaty on European Union, supra note 16, arts. 129b-d, at 25. One hotly
contested issue is whether the term "infrastructure" means the actual wires con-
necting the system or also services such as bulletin boards and electronic mail.
Suzanne Perry, Council to Debate Postal, Telecommunications Service Texts, Reuter
European Community Report, Dec. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
REUEC File.
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States. Indeed, the technology of the most advanced countries
such as France, Germany and Britain, is currently one to one-
and-a-half years behind that of the United States.24 In a mar-
ket where a new generation of products appears every six or
seven months, lagging two to three cycles behind severely
impairs market competitiveness.25
Even within the European Union disparity exists between
member nations' access to technology. In Italy, for example,
many businesses use personal computers but network connec-
tions between regional enclaves are rare.26 The difficulty of
setting up such connections in Italy and throughout the Union
is exacerbated by entrenched public monopolies, which can
raise the cost of installing or leasing a telecommunications link
up to five times more than the price of a comparable service in
the United States. Some state agencies demand that the user
obtain their permission for such activity-a process which can
raise the costs of basic hardware such as modems and two-way
telephone jacks.2
Despite these obstacles, user demand has grown exponen-
tially. Experts estimate a growth of up to three billion dollars
in the European online service market over the next five
years." Access to computer networks is a matter of particular
concern in the academic and scientific communities. Several
networks are now in operation, most notably RARE, an acro-
nym for Reseaux Associes pour la Recherche Europeene (Net-
works Associated for European Research).2 RARE connects
about forty academic networks in a manner similar to that of
the U.S.-based Internet."0 RARE was also responsible for ini-
tiating EuropaNET, another transborder "network of net-
works." The individual nets themselves include Britain's Joint
24. Jack Powers, What's the World Coming To?, LAN MAGAZINE, May 1993, at
38.
25. See generally PAUL CARROLL, BIG BLUES: THE UNMAKING OF IBM (1993)
(detailing how over-bureaucratizing and giving insufficient attention to research
and development caused the computer corporation's downfall).
26. Powers, supra note 24, at 38.
27. James 0. Jackson, It's A Wired, Wired World, TIME, Spring 1995, (Special
Issue), at 80, 81.
28. An Online Deal for Bertelsmann, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995, at D4.
29. Knit Your Own Superhighway, supra note 21, at 101-02.
30. As of this writing, the Internet connects some twenty million users to
twenty thousand subsidiary networks in 140 countries. David Bottoms, The 'Net'
Gets Raised, INDUSTRY WK., May 16, 1994, at 40.
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Academic Network (JANET), Germany's DFN and DNET, and
France's FNET, ARISTOTE, and REUNIR.31 There are also
transborder networks, such as USENET and BITNET, that
allow scientists at universities throughout the European Union
to exchange electronic mail and access paperless journals."
Business and individual consumers also recognize the efficien-
cy of what commentators have dubbed the "Infobahn."33 One
of the most popular applications, the World Wide Web, allows
users to navigate Internet sites by means of a point-and-click
graphical interface.34 The number of linked hypertext docu-
ments available to users worldwide has grown to several thou-
sand since the Web's creation in 1992,"5 supporting ventures
from online journals36 to virtual malls."
Computer network usage in the European Union has risen
sufficiently to cause concern about safeguarding copyrights,
and will continue to do so in the years ahead." At the macro-
level, the European Union has every incentive to clarify copy-
right policy on new technologies and to harmonize its own
standards so as to improve its position in the world digital
market. Capitalizing on these new opportunities will require a
two-pronged effort of technical initiative and legal harmoniza-
tion. Just as networked computers rely on "protocols" to trans-
late each others' communications,39 human users are begin-
31. See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on
Global Computer Networks, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1993).
32. Id. at 18.
33. William Safire, On Language: Footprints on the Infobahn, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
17, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 20. Although first applied to United States Vice Pres-
ident Al Gore's plan for an "information superhighway," the term seems particular-
ly appropriate to the European setting.
34. The Web itself is of European origin, having been developed at CERN, the
European Particle Physics Institute in Geneva, Switzerland. Richard W. Wiggins,
Webolution, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 1995, at 33, 36.
35. Id. at 36-38.
36. Kevin M. Savetz, The Medium Is the Matrix, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 1995,
at 70.
37. Aaron Weiss, Hot Spots, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 1995, at 78 (describing
offerings such as the Internet Shopkeeper at http://vww.ip.netlshops.hmtl and
Main Street at Downtown Anywhere at http://www.awa.com).
38. The potential for development has prompted German media giant
Bertelsmann A.G. to embark on a joint venture with Internet services provider
America Online, Inc. An Online Deal for Bertelsmann, supra note 28, at D4.
39. See generally, GILSTER, supra note 1, at 16-17 (discussing the role of pro-
tocol within the "metanetwork" of the Internet). The European Union, too. may be
seen as a metanetwork of individual cultures, each of which has its own legal
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ning to develop rules for online interaction. Members of the
electronic and economic communities must cooperate to devise
viable standards rather than raising protectionist barriers, for
such restraints are irrelevant in a digital market. A brief over-
view of the European Union treaties and related intellectual
property law is helpful in situating this effort in its interna-
tional context.
A. Treaties Establishing the European Union
The Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht in
1992, created several institutions responsible for enacting and
interpreting European Union law. The four most important
institutions are the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the
Court of Justice and the European Parliament.0 The Council
is made up of representatives from each member nation who
have the authority to bind their countries to legal and political
agreements.41 The Council meets regularly in "formations"
grouped by policy area, such as the General Affairs Council or
the Internal Market Council,42 and members' votes are
weighted according to the population of the country which they
represent.43 The Treaty also grants the Council sweeping pow-
ers of decision-making and implementation.44 Some of these
powers are shared with the Commission, whose members are
charged with representing the interests of the Union as a
whole.4" Member states' representation is proportional to pop-
ulation.46 Among the many elements of the Commission's
complex role is the power to implement 1992 Treaty provisions
and to hand down opinions giving guidance to member nations
who have violated these laws. The Commission may investi-
protocol.
40. Treaty on European Union, supra note 15, art. 4, at 6.
41. Id. art. 146, at 131.
42. DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 22 (3d
ed. 1993).
43. Id. at 44.
44. EEC TREATY art. 145.
45. Article 157(2) of the EEC Treaty as amended by the 1992 Treaty defines
Commission members as having "complete independence." Id. The Parliament, in
contrast, is "the collective voice of the Community electorate." WYA'TT &
DASHWOOD, supra note 42, at 32.
46. In 1993, Parliament's membership was fixed at 518. WYATT & DAsIiVoOD,
supra note 42, at 32.
47. EEC TREATY art. 155 (giving commission power to implement the 1992
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gate and decide upon complaints in areas such as allegations of
unfair competition. The Commission is subject to review by the
Court of First Instance, whose decisions can in turn be ap-
pealed to the Court of Justice. This court is the highest in the
Union and also has jurisdiction over questions requiring inter-
pretation of the 1992 Treaty.48
Each entity participates in making the supranational stat-
utory and case law that governs interaction between Union
members. While Union law as codified in the 1992 Treaty is
recognized as the supreme law of the land,49 the Council and
Commission may make law through regulations, directives,
and decisions."0 Regulations are binding in their entirety and
applicable to all member nations; directives are statements of
a legislative goal binding only nations to which they are ad-
dressed and leaving the choice of "form and means" to those
nations' authorities; and decisions apply to the designated
nations without explicitly leaving them the right to set proce-
dure."'
B. The Telecommunications Directives
Pursuant to these powers, the European Union has begun
to lay the technological and legal foundations for the networks
of the future. Telephone conversations and radio and television
broadcasts are the only modes of communication that approach
the nets' speed and territorial diversity. Indeed, communica-
tion between computers happens by means of devices called
modulating demodulators or "modems," which translate com-
puter data into electronic impulses that pass through the tele-
phone wires. Moreover, many of the corporate vendors current-
ly providing telecommunications services are seeking to devel-
op the computer technology to help pave the "Infobahn."52 The
economic and policy concerns informing recent telecommunica-
Treaty which amends the EEC Treaty). The Commission may only act pursuant to
powers explicitly mentioned in this Treaty or granted by acts of the Council. Trea-
ty on European Union, supra note 15, art. 4(1), at 6.
48. Treaty on European Union, supra note 15, art. 177, at 35.
49. WYATT & DAS-BVOOD, supra note 42, at 57.
50. EEC TREATY art. 189.
51. Id.
52. See Carla Rapoport, The New U.S. Push into Europe, FORTUNE, Jan. 10,
1994, at 73 (describing multimedia ventures spearheaded by the European divi-
sions of American firms such as NYNEX, Turner Broadcasting, and Telewest).
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tions directives provide insights into the European Union's
expectations of its new technologies.
Union law-making institutions have concentrated on build-
ing a policy framework rather than enunciating prescriptive
measures.53 To this end the Commission has issued a Green
Paper54 and the Council a Directive.55 In addition to the usu-
al problems of convincing member nations to align their sepa-
rate interests, proponents of harmonizing the law face opposi-
tion from the public monopolies controlling telecommunications
services in many countries." The Commission's Green Paper
attempted to compromise between the interests of the en-
trenched public monopolies and the developing Union market.
To avoid withdrawing the power conferred by state monopolies,
the Green Paper endorsed "re-regulation" as opposed to com-
plete deregulation. Under its program, the state-run operators
were to retain control over "basic services," while "value-added
services" were to be opened to all providers.57 The only flaw in
this approach was the Green Paper's vagueness in defining its
terms. Commentators tend to agree that basic services include
maintenance of the wires transporting the data and that value-
added services comprise such items as electronic mail and
online databases. 5 However, this dichotomy collapses with
technology's advance. In a market developing so rapidly, where
53. Marc T. Austin, European Telecommunications Policy and Open Network
Provision: The Evolution of a Regulatory Methodology, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 97 (1993).
54. Toward a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development
of the Common Market for Telecommunications Service and Equipment,
COM(87)290 final [hereinafter Green Paper on Telecommunications]. A Green Pa-
per is a Commission report based on experts' findings analyzing a problem and
recommending a solution. The Commission distributes the Green Paper and result-
ing draft directive to interested organizations, most notably, member nations' gov-
ernments. This initiates a process of debate and revision involving the member
nations' experts, the Commission, the Council and the Parliament before the Direc-
tive is eventually adopted by the Council. For a detailed account of this procedure
and how it produced the Directive on Software Protection, see Arthur Fakes, The
EEC's Directive on Software Protection and Its Moral Rights Loophole, 5 SOFTWARE
L.J. 531 (1992).
55. Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the Establishment of the
Internal Market for Telecommunications Services Through the Implementation of
the Open Network Provision, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 1 [hereinafter Council Directive
90/387].
56. Austin, supra note 53, at 98.
57. Green Paper on Telecommunications, supra note 54, at 36.
58. Austin, supra note 53, at 105 n.32.
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today's extras soon become tomorrow's essentials, allowing
state-run monopolies control over "basic services" can only lead
to counterproductive arguments over the term's meaning and a
corresponding reduction in available utilities."9
When the Green Paper's proposals were enacted in a "Ser-
vices Directive" reaffirming the public operators' control over
basic services, a need to balance this control became clear.
Accordingly, the Council adopted the Directive for Open Net-
work Provision in 1990."o The Open Network Directive sought
to liberalize the market by ensuring that state operators could
not discriminate against private providers. It promulgated a
process for setting uniform technical standards so that new
contenders would not be forced to invent different products for
each country.61 The Directive also demanded that the state
monopolies publish their own standards for conditions like
transmission quality and maintenance arrangements so that
independent providers would be well-informed enough to offer
competing services.62 A final condition advocated billing cus-
tomers on an objective "cost-oriented" basis, cautioning the
monopolies against imposing protective tariffs. Despite this
important step toward market transparency, the Directive
ultimately left the task of fixing actual rates to the individual
nations.63
The regulatory framework sketched in the two
telecommunications directives was given substance by the
Council Directive on the Application of Open Network Provi-
sion to Leased Lines.' Leased lines connect users with infor-
mation stored in computer databases. Generally, the state
monopolies lease the circuits to private providers, who then
59. The Green Paper itself concedes that advances in network technology and
the trend towards integration of services have "led to a blurring of traditional
boundaries between services. There is at present no agreed definition of 'basic
services' within the Community .... " Green Paper on Telecommunications, supra
note 55, at 41.
60. Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on Competition in the
Markets for Telecommunications Services, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 10 [hereinafter Com-
mission Directive 90/388/EEC].
61. Austin, supra note 53, at 111.
62. Commission Directive 90/388/EEC, supra note 60.
63. Id.
64. Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the Application of Open
'Network Provision to Leased Lines, 1992 O.J. (L 165) 27.
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offer the databases to subscribers.65 As more consumers turn
to computer networks for information and recreation, the prob-
ability increases that they will bypass the more costly state-
run services in favor of those available on leased lines. Again,
the European Union legislature effected a compromise between
the consumers' and the monopolies' conflicting interests. Under
the Open Network Provision Directive the government opera-
tors must ensure that a certain number of leased lines will be
subject to the Open Network standards of managed competi-
tion, while all other lines can be leased without these restric-
tions.66 This gradual deregulation bodes well for competition
among computer network operators. By emphasizing system
interoperability67 and cost-based pricing, the Commission and
Council have laid the foundations for a dynamic industry.
The European Union began to build an international infra-
structure on these foundations during a Brussels conference
between the world's leading industrial nations. Members of the
"G7" agreed to cooperate on eleven international projects rang-
ing from linking national emergency systems to creating global
educational networks." Simultaneously, the European tele-
communications industry is undergoing privatization in an
effort to encourage competition and reduce the currently high
costs of access. 9 The participants in these global networking
projects have recognized that further copyright harmonization
is needed for the global information infrastructure's commer-
cial success.70 Both the emerging Common Market and the
developing networks must resolve several tensions between the
free flow of goods and the proprietary rights in intellectual
property that ensure these goods' continued production.
65. See Austin, supra note 53.
66. Council Directive 90/387/EEC, supra note 55.
67. The 1991 Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs de-
scribes interoperability as the "functional interconnection and interaction" defined
as "the ability to exchange information and mutually to use the information which
has been exchanged . . . ." Council Directive 911250/EEC, supra note 20, at 43.
68. Joseph Schuman, Projects Down the Pike, VARIETY, Mar. 13-19, 1995, at
41.
69. Jackson, supra note 27, at 80-81.
70. John Markoff, Unraveling Copyright Rules for Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1995, at D1.
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II. THINKING LOCALLY, ACTING GLOBALLY: THE DANGERS OF
APPLYING TERRITORIAL COPYRIGHT TO INTERNATIONAL
NETWORKS
"Zli addition to, prescribing the process by which laws are
made, the Treaty Establishing the European Community di-
rectly regulates member nations' copyright law by virtue of its
allusions to "industrial and commercial property."71 Courts
have construed this phrase broadly, applying it to literary and
artistic works as well as the traditional subjects of patents and
trademarks.72 Copyright's territorial nature means that rights
in the same work can vary from country to country within the
Union.73 To a certain degree, the Treaty reaffirms this
territoriality with its insistence that the Treaty "shall in no
way prejudice the system existing in Member States governing
the system of property ownership."74 The European Court of
Justice commented on the differences between national intel-
lectual property rights in a frequently cited patent case, warn-
ing that "the variations between the different legislative sys-
tems on this subject are capable of creating obstacles both to
the free movement of the [protected] products and to competi-
tion within the common market."7" To prevent national differ-
ences from interfering with the establishment of a common
market, the Treaty on European Union specifies that Union
law will control the resolution of most such conflicts.76 In gen-
eral, the European Community Treaty supersedes agreements
negotiated before it came into force, including the Berne Con-
vention.77
71. EEC TREATY art. 36.
72. See, e.g., Case C-10/89, SA CNL Sucal-NV v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R.
3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571; Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops,
Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 329, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 460; Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon
Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmdirkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487,
[1971] 10 C.M.L.R. 631.
73. Jehoram et al., supra note 17, § 3[2], at 30.
74. EEC TREATY art. 222; see also Ronald E. Myrick, Influences Affecting the
Licensing of Rights in a Unitary European Market, 4 FORDUAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 81 (1993).
75. Case 24/67, Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55, [1968] 3
C.M.L.R. 47.
76. EEC TREATY art. 234.
77. Id.; Case 10/61, Commission v. Italian Republic, 1962 E.C.R. 1, 11962] 1
C.M.L.R. 187 (new obligations arising under the Treaty Establishing the European
Community override conflicting rights held under an earlier agreement, limiting
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A. The Outer Limits of Territorial Copyright
Although the Berne Convention allows rights holders to
invoke extra protection under the law of their nation of origin,
Union case law precludes them from exercising the national-
law rights in such a way as to hinder the free flow of goods
between Union members. This rule originated in the case of
Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-
Grossmdrkte GmbH & Co. KG, 8 which addressed tensions
between German law and the Treaty Establishing the Europe-
an Community. The Deutsche Grammophon Record company
sold records in Germany and France through a subsidiary,
Polydor. A rival record distributor, Metro, bought records from
Polydor and resold them in Germany at a price well below
plaintiffs. 9 Without invalidating the German right entirely or
instructing member nations on the proper scope of exclusive
distribution rights, the European Court of Justice held that
allowing the plaintiff to block the sale would "be in conflict
with the provisions prescribing the free flow of products within
the common market.""0
The doctrine was refined in another case involving record
distributors' German rights. In Musik-Vetrieb Membran GmbH
v. GEMA,8' the copyright collective GEMA claimed that a re-
cord company had violated owners' right to collect German
royalties by importing records and cassettes into Germany
from other member nations-even though the copyright owners
had agreed to the foreign sales. France, as one of the countries
from which the records were imported, intervened in favor of
GEMA with an argument that the composers had a moral right
to enjoin actions they believed were damaging to their reputa-
tions." The European Court rejected this argument, noting
that the rights holders had agreed to the sale of their record-
ings in the member nations from which they were imported.
The court reasoned that GEMA's members could not invoke a
German royalty right on works first sold in other countries
once they had contractually agreed to reap the profits of inter-
Article 234 to the rights held by third countries).
78. Case 78/70, 1971 E.C.R. 487, [1971] 10 C.M.L.R. 631.
79. Id. 1971 E.C.R. at 490, [1971] 10 C.M.L.R. at 634.
80. Id. 1971 E.C.R. at 500, [1971] 10 C.M.L.R. at 658.
81. Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, 1981 E.C.R. 147, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 44.
82. Id. 1981 E.C.R. at 173, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. at 64.
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national marketing. The Court concluded that enforcing such a
right would create the equivalent of a restrictive tariff on re-
cord and cassette sales and would thus impede international
commerce.
83
The GEMA decision arrived at its result by applying the
"exhaustion of rights" principle. Under European Union law,
national rights in intellectual property are "exhausted" once
the author or transferee lawfully markets the work in another
member nation. Thus, the rights owner can no longer appeal to
the law of his or her country for remedies against re-importa-
tion of the goods at a lower price. However, national law dif-
fers from European Union law in that it provides a remedy for
a rights holder in this situation.' The European Union view
prevails when enforcing national rights would threaten the
free market.85
1. The Black-Letter Law of Grey Goods
Exhaustion of authors' national rights under the Treaty on
European Union often facilitates an alternate system of dis-
tributing goods known as parallel importation. In a typical
situation, goods retailed lawfully in an exporting country are
also imported into another country, where they are sold at a
lower price.86 A distributor in this second country buys up the
83. Id. 1981 E.C.R. at 176-77, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. at 66-67.
84. WYATt & DASIVOOD, supra note 42, at 575-76.
85. Exceptions to the rule are enumerated in Article 36 of the EEC Treaty,
which allows trade restrictions in the form of enforcing national copyrights as long
as the rights are not "arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
between Member States." EEC TREATY art. 36. Moreover, restrictions must be nec-
essary to the protection of a valid copyright. Id. (allowing certain barriers to trade
if "justified on grounds of. . . the protection of industrial and commercial proper-
ty.").
The European Court of Justice has allowed a British national to enjoin
"bootlegged" recordings under German law. Normally, this right is not available to
citizens of countries other than Germany. C-92/92, Collins V. Imtrat
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 11993] 3 C.M.L.R. 773. However, the Court of Justice
reasoned that preventing the plaintiff from enforcing his rights under the German
copyright law simply because he was British would be tantamount to condoning
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Such discrimination would contravene
Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. See EEC TREATY art. 7. Accordingly,
the court granted performing artists the right to enjoin unauthorized copies of
their performances under the law of the country in which these copies are made
or distributed. Collins, [19931 3 C.M.L.R. at 793.
86. WARWICK A. ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS 1-3 (1993).
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goods, re-imports them into the country of origin, and sells
them there for less than the going rate." Even after absorb-
ing shipping costs, tariffs, and related fees, parallel importers
can realize substantial gains."
Owners of intellectual property rights oppose parallel
importation because their right to exploit copies dwindles in
value when cheaper copies flood the market. Yet this traffic in
resold goods is not per se illegal, as reflected in its designation
as a "grey" rather than a "black" market. 9 Indeed, European
Union courts have repeatedly prioritized consumers' interest in
obtaining goods at a lower price over fights holders' ability to
maximize their income from the sale of copies." Nevertheless,
the ease with which intellectual property can be transported
and copied by means of computer networks suggests a need to
reconsider this balance of benefits and burdens.
2. Parallel Importation in the Digital Market
In the digital market, works of authorship are among the
goods "imported" and "exported" over transborder computer
links.9' These goods defy hypostatization even more than tra-
ditional forms of intellectual property, but are equally worthy
of protection. The exhaustion doctrine should be applied spar-
ingly in this market because digital goods are easier to reroute
from one country to another as parallel imports than are tan-
gible works. Copyrighted works stored in a database located in
one country could be transmitted to a computer 'located in a
country with less stringent or nonexistent copyright controls.
The works could then be retransmitted to a purchaser in a
87. See, e.g., Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, Musik-Vetrieb Membran GmbH v.
GEMA, 1981 E.C.R. 147, [19811 2 C.M.L.R. 44. In this case, the parallel importer's
price was less than the minimum imposed by the government.
88. See generally ROTHNIE, supra note 86.
89. Jehoram et al., supra note 17, § 2[1][c][i], at 14.
90. See, e.g., Case 279/87, Tipp-Ex GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission, [1989-
1990 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) % 95,388 (1990) (hindering paral-
lel imports was held to offend the Treaty on European Union by leading to the
"artificial" maintenance of national markets); but see Joined Cases 56 & 58/64,
]ttablissements Consten SARL v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299, 345, [1966] 5
C.M.L.R. 418, 476 (Article 222 of the EEC Treaty quoted for the proposition that
Community laws of free movement and competition "shall in no way prejudice
existing systems and incidents of ownership in the member-states.").
91. See Burk, supra note 31.
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third country or in the nation of origin. The entire process
could be automated in a manner analogous to a "dial-back"
service offered by some telephone companies. This practice
allows a customer in one country to call an operator in another
country, who then reroutes the call through the second
country's less expensive telephone lines. Works appearing on a
net could similarly be rerouted using modems.2 This type of
transfer would appeal to "have-not" nations struggling to catch
up to the world's technological "haves." Receiving and process-
ing data from more developed nations lets the underdeveloped
countries collect revenues and have access to information. 3
In the digital market, application of the exhaustion doc-
trine would preclude the owner of the work from enforcing his
or her rights under the country of origin's law.94 The recipient
of the second transfer can thus download the work from the
foreign database without paying the full use fee. A digital
greymarket would arise, with parallel importers trafficking in
data just as they currently resell copyrighted and trademarked
products.
While the parallel importation of physical goods is tolerat-
ed on the ground that it facilitates consumers' access to the
goods, the digital market presents a very different predica-
ment. When intellectual property is embodied only in physical
goods, consumer access is limited by the goods' finite number
and by the time and money necessary to ship them from manu-
facturer to retailer. In contrast, works of authorship present on
a network can be transmitted rapidly enough and copied easily
enough to obviate comparisons to the physical market.
Consumers' dubious right to pay less for greymarket products
need no longer be safeguarded when works can be downloaded
and retrieved at minimal cost. Indeed, permitting authors to
enforce their copyrights in the limited context of the digital
92. See Austin, supra note 53.
93. See Alexander Gordeyev, Copyright Organizations Urge Piracy Crackdown,
Moscow TIMES, (Business), June 24, 1994, at 11 (Moscow head of Business Soft-
ware Alliance estimating that over ninety-five percent of software in the former
Soviet Union is illegally copied). For an example closer to home, see ROBERT A.
GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 789 (3d ed. 1989)
(reporting that the lack of protection for foreign authors in the newly freed Ameri-
can colonies created high demand for European works).
94. See Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-
GrossMdrkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 119711 10 C.M.L.R. 631.
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greymarket would ameliorate the imbalance, created by tech-
nological innovation, between rights holders' interests and
potential infringers' new capabilities. 5 Such a policy would
reaffirm the rationale of copyright itself: encouraging a steady
stream of new works in all venues by vesting limited propri-
etary rights in authors. Where online networks are concerned,
a free market of goods should not be encouraged at the ex-
pense of the free market of ideas.
B. Can Digital Authors Find Relief From Exhaustion?
Efforts to discourage the practice of parallel importing by
enforcing intellectual property rights are only occasionally suc-
cessful. However, Union-wide recognition of the limits of terri-
torial copyright where new technologies are concerned has led
to increased concern for copyright owners' interests. Courts
and legislatures alike acknowledge the efforts involved in cre-
ating innovative types of intellectual property. Recent decisions
reflect the tensions between rewarding the originators of digi-
tal works and ensuring public access to these works. Cases
analyzing intellectual property licenses under Union competi-
tion law offer several possibilities for authors wishing to safe-
guard rights that would otherwise be exhausted once they
choose to distribute a work on the Common Market.
One method for blocking parallel imports is an agreement
between the rights owner and a distributor that splits copy-
right ownership along national lines. 7 Under this type of ar-
rangement, each party may enforce its rights under national
law against parallel importers. Thus, an author in country A
could contract with a database owner in country B to dissemi-
nate a work by means of a network in B. To ensure that the
work would not then be resold to an offshore data haven, the
author might attempt to condition an exclusive distribution
right on the licensee's promise not to export the work. Howev-
95. See Dennis J. Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property
Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2594, 2595 (1994) (focussing on digital products'
"vulernability to misappropriation" as a type of market failure under the current
intellectual property regime).
96. See, e.g., Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology:
Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action, COM(88)172 final at 18-94 (discuss-
ing threats posed by piracy).
97. ROTHNIE, supra note 86, at 394.
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er, the European Commission would probably hold that such a
provision restricted competition in violation of Article 85(1) of
the Treaty on European Union.s"
By retaining the right to invoke territorial copyright laws
against possible parallel importers, the author has effectively
denied competitors the right to make the work available for a
lower price in A.9 A user in A who wished to view or down-
load the work would have to obtain it from a licensed database
or network. Assuming the user's computer can communicate
with the licensed system, he or she would still have to pay a
set fee for the transaction. Allowing a single licensee to control
the price of network transactions prevents other networks and
databases from offering works at competitive rates. Limiting
efficient and reasonably priced user access to citizens of one
country is inappropriate not only to the Common Market, but
to a network system whose goal is to facilitate information
sharing.
Nonetheless, the European Court of Justice has permitted
territorial restrictions based on national law when a rights
owner exploits the intellectual property product by means of a
service as well as selling it embodied in a good. In Coditel v.
S.A. Cing Vog Films (Coditel I),' the Court upheld a license
granting exclusive distribution rights in a film to a Belgian
company.'0 ' Cine Vog, the licensee, had promised not to per-
mit television or cable broadcast of the film until forty months
98. See Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Ettablissements Consten SARL v. Commis-
sion, 1966 E.C.R. 299, [1966] 5 C.M.L.R. 418 (applying the "layered analysis" to
determine whether an agreement is acceptable under the competition rules, and
held that a contract between a supplier and an exclusive distributor was unduly
restrictive when it contained a promise that neither party would resell the goods
outside their allotted "territories").
99. It has been suggested that an exclusive distribution license alone does not
violate Article 85, but that the addition of non-export provisions and emphasis on
territorial ownership render the agreement collusive. See Case 56/65, Soci t6 Tech-
nique Minibre v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E.C.R. 235, [1966] 5 C.M.L.R.
357 (exclusive distribution rights not denied when agreement did not contain ex-
port bans).
100. Case 62/79, 1980 E.C.R. 881, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 328.
101. The case was affirmed on appeal in Case 262/81, Coditel SA v. Cin6-Vog
Films SA (Coditel II), 1982 E.C.R. 3381, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 49. Although it re-
manded the case to the Belgian court for findings of fact on whether exclusive
exhibition rights encouraged investment in films, the European Court of Justice
stressed the need to stimulate financial support based on the nature of the prod-
uct.
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after the film was first released in Belgian movie theaters. °2
Exclusive rights in the film were also granted to a German
company without any comparable restrictions. Coditel, a Bel-
gian cable company, taped the unrestricted German broadcast
and aired the film for its own subscribers.0 3 In allowing Cine
Vog to enforce its license, the Court recognized the need to
protect intellectual property when the work in question could
be presented to the public an infinite number of times and
when the rights holder would not be able to exploit the work
without considering the means of circulation at issue. With
their ability to be copied and relayed from computer to com-
puter, online copyrighted works meet the court's first criterion.
Furthermore, just as no reasonable rights owner would market
a film without considering its prospects for television broad-
casts, authors who create with computers must realize their
machines' potential for distribution. Restrictive licenses regard-
ing electronically published works should be considered under
the less stringent standard of Coditel I and Coditel II.
Some exclusive licenses encourage, rather than inhibit, the
distribution of intellectual property.0 4 Limiting licensees'
rights by denying the exclusive license would discourage inno-
vation by reducing the potential for exploiting new products.
Potential investors in new technologies will be reluctant to
commit their funds without the certainty that they will be able
to recoup some of the profits, so an overly inflexible approach
risks chilling technological development."0 Licensees might
102. Case 62/79, 1980 E.C.R. at 884, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 329.
103. Id.
104. See Case 258/78, L.C. Nungesser KG v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 2015,
[1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278. In deciding the validity of an exclusive open license, the
European Court of Justice Observed:
lain exemption from the prohibition in Article 85(1) [of the EEC Treaty]
may be granted in the case of any agreement between undertakings
which contributes to improving the production of goods or to promoting
technical progress, and which does not impose on the undertakings con-
cerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of the
objectives.
Id. 1982 E.C.R. at 2073, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 356. The Maize Seed court upheld
licensor's right to prevent his seeds from being produced and sold by other licens-
ees in a particular territory. Id. 1982 E.C.R. at 2071, [19831 1 C.M.L.R. at 354-55.
The court declined, however, to enforce absolute territorial protection. Id. 1982
E.C.R. at 2074, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 356.
105. See generally Randolph W. Tritell, The Application of Block Exemptions to
Intellectual Property Licensing in the European Community, 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTS.
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balk at investing in a product if their interests were not safe-
guarded from competition from other licensees or the licensor
itself. In turn, the number of products on the market would de-
crease as potential licensees refused to support innovation.
To encourage investment in the creation and distribution
of new types of intellectual property, the Commission exempts
certain types of restrictive agreements, making them per se
legal. These exemptions cover patents and know-how licensing,
but their general principles are relevant to copyright licensing
agreements.' The patent licensing block exemptions allow
the licensor and licensees to implement certain territorial re-
strictions. Permitted constraints include forbidding the licensor
to exploit the licensed invention or grant licenses to others in a
licensed territory for the patent's duration.' 7 These restric-
tions permit a licensor to control the distribution of its product
to some degree, but without granting a monopoly to one licens-
ee. When extended to copyrighted works, these exemptions
allow the rights holder to select an exclusive distributor, but
not to condition that exclusivity on the distributor's refusal to
engage in parallel data importation.' 8 Likewise, a provision
requiring the licensee to inform the licensor of infringements of
intellectual property rights or help enforce those rights against
third parties may contradict Article 85(1)."9 A license will
not fall under a block exemption, and will be held to
impermissibly impede the free flow of goods, if it limits the
class of customers the licensee may serve or forbids the licens-
ee to sell the product in other licensees' territories for more
than five years."0 Finally, no license will be held valid..
which allows the parties to refuse to supply the product to
12 (1993).
106. Id.
107. Commission Regulation 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements,
art. 1, 1984 O.J. (L 219) 15, 18-19 [hereinafter Commission Regulation 2349/841.
108. See Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, ltablissements Consten SARL v. Commis-
sion, 1966 E.C.R. 299, [19661 5 C.M.L.R. 418.
109. Tritell, supra note 105, at 12-13.
110. Commission Regulation 2349/84, supra note 107, art. 3, at 20-21.
111. A party might be able to obtain an exemption by proving that the provi-
sion does not violate Art. 85(3) of the Treaty. See EEC TREATY art, 85(3). No
record exists of a litigant satisfying this heavy burden of proof. Given the case
law, it is unlikely that a digital rights holder could make a compelling policy
argument in support of such a restriction.
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European Union users who wish to market the product else-
where within the Union. 112 Applied to copyright, the block ex-
emptions reinforce the exhaustion doctrine by preventing a
rights owner from stopping parallel imports. The emergence of
a digital greymarket in copyrighted works might demand re-
consideration of these rules."'
In contrast to restrictive territorial licensing, an author's
or inventor's simple refusal to grant a license to a third party
is not generally considered anticompetitive. No obligation ex-
ists to grant distribution rights to third parties, "even for a
reasonable royalty.""' The author could thus retain the core
of rights granted under national law by declining to license the
work to a publisher. Before the advent of electronic publishing,
this decision would have effectively precluded the author from
exploiting the work by selling copies. In contrast, a digital
author can propagate text, graphics, music, and video through-
out the network without ever contracting with a third-party
distributor.
However, a recently decided trio of cases might allow third
parties to force an intellectual property proprietor to license
copyrights.'15 The "Magill cases" denied three broadcasting
organizations the ability to prevent competitors from copying
and selling lists of their television programs which was a right
granted under national law. The broadcasters declined to li-
cense their copyrighted listing of television programs to the
Magill Company, which sought to produce a comprehensive
guide to all three sets of programs. In granting Magill the
license, the Commission reasoned that the broadcasters had
unfairly prevented a product from reaching consumers.1 6 The
112. Commission Regulation 2349/84, supra note 107, art. 3(11), at 21.
113. The refusal to restrict parallel importing in the patent context might ulti-
mately make network technology more accessible and spur its harmonization with-
in the European Community. Without the price discrepancies caused by unequal
access, no motivation would exist to re-import copyrighted works at lower rates.
114. Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4
C.M.L.R. 122 (design owner's unwillingness to grant a license for products incorpo-
rating the protected design was not an abuse of a dominant position).
115. Case T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 485,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance); Case T-70/89, British Brodcasting Corp.
v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 535, [19911 4 C.M.L.R. 745 (Ct. First Instance); Case
T-76/89, Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 575,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 745 (Ct. First Instance).
116. Compounding the problem of distinguishing a grant of rights from an
265
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
breadth of this holding is still uncertain as the case has been
appealed to the European Court of Justice. If the Court affirms
the Commission's result, database proprietors and even indi-
vidual authors might be unable to block third parties from
using their digitized works in competing, unauthorized prod-
ucts.
Given the fact that many online authors distribute their
own works by electronic self-publishing rather than through
licensees, it is to be hoped that the European Court makes a
determination in favor of authors' rights. Copyright owners
should be forced to license to third parties only if the rights
holder has irrationally stopped a steady stream of goods on
whose continued production the third party reasonably re-
lied."' Since authors do not produce intellectual property
goods in large, consistent amounts, the Magill cases' rationale
should at most be limited to licenses between database propri-
etors, network operators, or similar distributors. Individual
authors might look to other licensing options to enforce their
national rights and recoup royalties in a manner that comports
with competition law.
C. Collective Licensing on the Networks
Collective licensing is one method which allows authors to
receive royalties on the sale or performance of copies of their
works. This type of licensing agreement was conceived to allow
authors to exploit public performances of non-dramatic works.
It remains the norm for situations like online dissemination in
which so many copies are distributed that the individual au-
thor has difficulty enforcing his or her right."8 Under a col-
lective licensing agreement, an authors' society issues one
exercise of rights, the Commission introduced a new distinction between the "legit-
imate" and "improper" exercise of rights. See Myrick, supra note 74, 104.
117. See, e.g., Case 311/84, Centre beige d'6tudes de march6-t616marketing
(CBEM) SA v. Compagnie luxembourgeoise de tldiffusion SA, 1985 E.C.R. 3261,
3279, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 558, 574 (company violated Article 86 by reserving a busi-
ness opportunity which another company could easily have taken as "part of its
activities on a neighboring but separate market . . ").
118. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 5 (1990) (observing that "with the
ever newer waves of new technologies, the field in which individual exercise of
rights is impossible or, at least, impractical, has been constantly and rapidly wid-
ened.") [hereinafter WIPO].
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license for all the works of its constituents. A member general-
ly assigns the rights of public performance and mechanical
reproduction to the collection society. In the digital context,
these rights might encompass, although they should not be
limited to, the ability to charge an individual user or distribu-
tor for viewing or downloading the work."' The society is au-
thorized to collect the proceeds from the license agreement and
redistribute the moneys to the authors under a predetermined
formula."' Authors are thus empowered to enforce their eco-
nomic rights in copies of their works. Consumers benefit as
well since they may use a broader range of works without
negotiating with individual authors.
Collectives also reduce the costs of monitoring the uses
and collecting the authors' fees.' 2' These organizations are
politically well-equipped to manage the digital rights of their
author, composer, and artist members. Unlike other restrictive
licensing schemes, the administration of copyrights by authors'
collectives has been accepted by both the courts'22 and the
legislatures" as compatible with European Union competi-
119. In this example, viewing a work onscreen may be analogized to a "public
performance" and downloading it may be seen as a type of "mechanical reproduc-
tion."
120. This formula is usually based on considerations such as the type of work,
the number of times it is used, and the length of the author's membership in the
society. STANLEY M. BESEN & SHEILA N. KIRBY, COMPENSATING CREATORS OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COLLECTIVES THAT COLLECT 21 (1989).
121. WIPO, supra note 118, at 6.
122. See Case 402/85, Basset v. Socidt6 des Auteurs, Compositeurs, et Editeurs
de Musique (SACEM), 1987 E.C.R. 1747, [19871 3 C.M.L.R. 173 (national law allot-
ting a percentage of a discotheque's gross receipts to a collection society in return
for permission to play works from the collection society's repertoire was not an
anticompetetive measure under Articles 30, 36, or 86 of the EC Treaty). Compare
Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broadcasting Services, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19
(1979) (recognizing collective licensing as a help rather than a hindrance to the
free market since it reduced the costs of administering royalties and rewarded
authors, furthering "the commerce anticipated by the Copyright Act and protected
against restraint by the Sherman [Anti-Trust] Act . . ").
123. See, e.g., Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the Coordi-
nation of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright
Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission, 1993 O.J. (L 248)
15 (permitting holders of rights in cross-border satellite broadcasting and cable
transmission to transfer these rights to collection societies). This Directive is rele-
vant both for its substance, due to the physical similarities between broadcast
transmissions and computer networks, and for its form, since the law speaks to
the necessity of remunerating authors who create in new media. Compare Broad-
cast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 15 (noting Congressional intent that collection societ-
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tion law. Moreover, many nations explicitly recognize the col-
lectives in their copyright statutes.'24 While Union officials
once debated whether allowing reciprocal collection arrange-
ments between the societies would violate the competition
rules,'25 the difficulty of enforcing royalties in an expanding
international market has promoted cooperation among collec-
tives.12 Existing organizations could thus expand their cur-
rent operations to include the tracking of digitally distributed
works.'27 The categories of works already administered by the
European collection societies include several elements common
to network distribution, most notably the right to store and
retrieve graphic and textual works to and from databases.
Among these rights there is also the right to receive royalties
for the "home taping" of musical and audiovisual works, which
closely resembles a right to profit from users' "downloading"
ies should gather members' fees by means of the blanket license). Interestingly,
however, the opinion observed that "changes brought about by new technology or
new market techniques might also "undercut" the need for blanket licensing. Id. at
21 n.34; see also infra notes 138-39 (describing proposed methods of online track-
ing, which could also be applied to billing, thus obviating the blanket license.)
124. See LILIANE DE FAWCETT, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
PROPERTY 218-20, 229-30, 235-39 (Louise-Martin-Valiquette trans., 1991) (reprinting
French, German, and Italian statutes which recognize the collectives).
125. See Case 395/87, Ministhre public v. Tournier, 1989 E.C.R. 2521, [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 248 (addressing the validity, under the competition rules, of a collective's
refusal to license its own repertory or that of another collective to a similar soci-
ety in another country).
126. Artists' societies have addressed the problems of royalty collection caused
by large "satellite footprints" by paying fees to the collection society in the country
sending the signal (the "up-link" country) but calculating the fees according to the
size of the country receiving the transmission (the "down-link" country). The same
approach could reduce the difficulties of collecting fees for a network that spans
several nations. See William I. Hochberg, Fishing in the Black Box: Developments
in International Music Royalty Collecting, 26 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J. 114, 115
(1992).
127. In contrast to the collection societies' analysis of random airwave samples,
a tracking mechanism programmed into the networks and harmonized throughout
the Community would yield a complete and accurate record of user transactions.
See Nicholas E. Sciorra, Note, Self-Help & Contributory Infringement: The Law
and Legal Thought Behind a Little "Black-Box," 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 905
(1993) (discussing technological solutions in the context of video distribution). Com-
puterized protection against network break-ins has been introduced in the form of
a program entitled Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks (Satan).
Satan has been distributed globally over the Internet and termed a "promising
tool" by industry analysts. Laurie Flynn, Software That Pits Alarmists Against
Devil's Advocates, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1995, at 11. However, the very accessibil-
ity of Satan has raised concerns that the software will be used to facilitate, rather
than prevent security breaches. Id.
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works from the text.' With its prior experience, the Europe-
an collectives are therefore uniquely competent to serve the
growing digital market. National legislatures as well as the
Union's legislature must now demarcate the new elements
added to copyright's "bundle of rights" in a manner consistent
with their international obligations.
III. THE BERNE CONVENTION AND COMPUTER NETWORKS'
CHALLENGE TO CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
While copyright within the European Union is limited by
the laws of its member nations, these laws must meet a mini-
mum standard of protection enunciated by the Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property. Indi-
vidual Union countries may choose to implement higher stan-
dards. The Berne Convention has been characterized as "essen-
tially [a] choice-of-law treaty" because it offers a series of tests
for determining different works' status.'29 For example, a
work is protected if the country where it is first published is a
party to the treaty. 30 An unpublished work can claim the
same protection if the country in which the author is domiciled
is a party to the treaty. 3' Although both types of work re-
ceive the same minimum protection under the Berne Conven-
tion itself, variations in national law can undermine the
treaty's harmonizing effect.
A. Redefining "Publication"
The fundamental distinction between published and un-
published works is obscured when networks are involved. Arti-
cle 3(3) of the Berne Convention defines "published works" as
"works published with the consent of their authors, whatever
may be the means of manufacture of the copies, provided that
the availability of such copies has been such as to satisfy the
reasonable requirements of the public, having regard to the
128. The similarity is underscored by the fact that the collective license is the
only avenue currently available to enforce authors' rights in "home taping" or
downloading. See Id. at 70.
129. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 93, at 791.
130. Berne Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(1)(b), S. TREATY Doc. No. 27 at
39, 828 U.N.T.S. at 231.
131. Id. art. 3(1)(a), S. TREATY Doc. No. 27 at 39, 828 U.N.T.S. at 231.
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nature of the work." '132 This language seems broad enough to
include works transmitted by modems since whether the work
is sufficiently "available" to satisfy public expectations depends
upon "the nature of the work."
The drafters of the Berne Convention made the grant of
rights contingent upon the availability of copies because publi-
cation was the most important means of disseminating ideas
when the Convention was drafted. The capacity to reach broad-
er audiences through the airwaves or by means of electronic
pulses was not anticipated at the Convention's inception in
1886. Now, over a century later, publication rights must be
reinterpreted in the framework of digital publishing. This
reinterpretation can be effected by treating each time a work is
accessed on a network as the production of a "copy." Individual
users do not view a single copy contained in a common data-
base; rather, they generate their own copies each time the
elements of information comprising a work are sent to their
computers. The net can be most accurately analogized to a
book or music store in which the owner orders as many copies
of the work as buyers demand. The only difference is that a
database need only have one copy of the work "in stock." A
transmission request from a customer's computer will immedi-
ately produce a virtual copy. Downloading will fix the work in
tangible form, but a copy is made in the computer's memory
even if the user does not download.
Furthermore, the distribution of just one copy can consti-
tute publication if that single copy's market presence allows
reasonable access to the work.133 One copy of a work up-
loaded to a network can satisfy the public access requirement
because its "nature" allows and even encourages instantaneous
and widespread reproduction. Any user who wishes to access
the work may copy the original posted on the net, assuming
the copyright owner has granted permission. Under Article
3(3)'s first sentence, then, digitally created works seem to be
"published" within the meaning of the Berne Convention if
only one copy is distributed.
Interpreting the act of viewing a work available on a net
as a "performance" rather than a "publication" would deny
132. Id. art. 3(3), S. TREATY DOC. No. 27 at 39, 828 U.N.T.S. at 231.
133. RICKETSON, supra note 10, at 182 (giving the example of a film, which can
be viewed by many even if only one copy is distributed).
270 [Vol. XXI: I
1995] INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL PUBLISHING
rights to the authors, composers, and visual artists whose
works have traditionally been distributed in tangible form.
After defining publication, Article 3(3) goes on to exclude per-
formances and "the communication by wire or the broadcasting
of literary or artistic works" from the category of published
works.' The rationale underlying this exception is that the
act of transmission-until the advent of the nets-has typically
been a transient event which does not leave behind a tangible
copy.1"' A computer network's data relay is most similar to a
"performance" when the user views the work without storing it
to a disk, much as he or she would view a television program
or listen to the radio. Yet once the user chooses to copy the
work, tangible evidence of the online communication is created
and, under the present standard, the transfer becomes a "pub-
lication." Categorizing online works as being "broadcasted"
based on their literal "communication by wire" fails to recog-
nize that these works are exploited by sale on a per copy basis
to the large audiences that the Berne drafters associated with
print publishing. Allowing works certain safeguards if they are
downloaded, and thus "published," while denying these same
protections if they are merely viewed in a display would permit
the user rather than the author or rights holder to effectively
decide whether or not a work is published. This result would
be inconsistent with the Berne Convention's purpose.
13 6
Indeed, the Convention's drafters could not have foreseen
technology capable of storing individual works and allowing
consumers to fix the works in tangible form at will.'37 The
document's language thus assumes that the author or rights
holder decides whether or not the work is published.'38 An
134. Berne Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(3), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 27 at 39,
828 U.N.T.S. at 231.
135. See RICKETSON, supra note 10, at 189.
136. The Berne Convention's stated goal is "to protect, in as effective and uni-
form a manner as possible, the rights of authors in their literary or artistic
works . .. ." Berne Convention, supra note 9, Preamble, S. TREATY DOC. No. 27
at 37, 828 U.N.T.S. at 223.
137. See RICKETSON, supra note 10, at 191 (recognizing that "[ilt can be further
argued that this 'terminological error' [in the definition of 'published works'] will
become increasingly apparent as new means of disseminating works come into
existence.").
138. Berne Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(3), S. TREATY DOC NO. 27 at 39,
828 U.N.T.S. at 231 ("'[Plublished works' means works published with the consent
of their authors .... ").
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author who contracts with a database operator to make his or
her work available in that database has clearly given consent
for digital publication. This author's work will be stored per-
manently in a computer memory bank and will be accessible to
the public under the terms of Article 3(3). However, most digi-
tal authors bypass publishers altogether and post works on the
net directly from their own computers. These works also re-
main fixed in the computer's memory until erased. Therefore,
they are more like published works waiting on shelves to be
bought than television programs broadcasted only once. Absent
an express authorial provision that a digital work is intended
to be a performance, the metaphor of electronic "publication"
should be read literally in the eyes of the law.
B. Should Moral Rights Be Extended to Computer Networks?
Full Berne protection on the net means that moral rights
will attach to digital works. Authors' moral rights include the
right to be recognized as the work's author and, conversely, to
prevent others from being erroneously credited with his or her
work as well as the right to enjoin modifications of the work
that harm the author's reputation.139 Moral rights are sepa-
rate from economic rights under the Berne Convention,140 al-
lowing an author to restrict certain uses of a work even after
he or she has sold all other rights. Most member nations, how-
ever, usually recognize the alienability of moral rights."'
Moral rights would be extremely difficult to enforce on the
networks. In the case of the attribution right, a network user
can easily delete the author's name and re-disseminate the
work at the touch of a button. Removing all traces of author-
ship from a digital work generally demands much less effort
and expense than expunging them from a book jacket, album
cover, art work, or videocassette. This threat to rights holders
is compounded by the industry's reluctance to commit to tech-
nological solutions to piracy, such as "locking" devices implant-
ed in disks to prevent downloading." This hesitation is un-
139. Berne Convention, supra note 9, art. 6bis(l), S. TREATY DOC NO. 27 at 41,
828 U.N.T.S at 235.
140. Id. art. 6 bis(1), S. TREATY Doc No. 27 at 41, 828 U.N.T.S. at 235.
141. France and its former colonies are an exception to this general rule.
RICKETSON, supra note 10, at 467.
142. See Sciorra, supra note 127.
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derstandable in light of the fact that anti-copying mechanisms
can be neutralized by able programmers or "unlocked" by pro-
grams available on the underground market.' Finally, most,
if not all, Internet users log on under an assumed name. The
strings of letters and numbers used as network "addresses" do
not necessarily reveal the user's location or other identifying
information. Nor can government users force network users to
identify themselves at each log-on. Such measures would be a
gross intrusion of citizens' privacy and impossible to enforce
without a costly monitoring system.
Despite these obstacles, the right of attribution epitomizes
the Berne Convention's conception of authorship. Recognizing
and rewarding authors who contribute creative works to soci-
ety is the very foundation of copyright policy."4 Even when a
member nation acknowledges limited moral rights'45 or none
at all, a means of identifying authors in digital media is neces-
sary to encourage the production of new works. Excessive gov-
ernment intervention in the networks however, will only di-
minish competition in a still-uncertain venue. A better, though
far from perfect solution, lies in Union-wide legislation estab-
lishing a standard mechanism to be used on all computer net-
works. Computers linked to the net follow a "copy" command
when a user downloads to a disk or printer. A Union regula-
tion or directive would instruct network operators to embed
another command within the copy command in use on their
systems. This second set of instructions would automatically
transfer the author's name from its position on the original to
a designated space on the copy. Copyright notice would be
programmed to appear on each page of the duplicated work, or
every detail downloaded from a digitized image.146 While
143. The Internet itself is an excellent source of pirated software. See United
States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 536 (D. Mass. 1994) (federal prosecution of
a student bulletin board operator whose trafficking in copyrighted programs drew
"worldwide traffic generated by the offer of free software.")
144. Berne Convention, supra note 9, Preamble, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27 at 37,
828 U.N.T.S. at 223; cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the pow-
er 'Ito promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limit-
ed times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries . . .).
145. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (allowing moral rights of
attribution and integrity for visual artists in the United States).
146. The American-based legal networks WESTLAW and LEXIS currently use
such a system.
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these measures might not guarantee prevention of the criminal
equipped with state-of-the-art technology and computer exper-
tise, harmonizing network commands internationally would
make copyright infringement a far more difficult process. Leg-
islative commitment to protecting rights holders interests
would also signal the end of the nets' operation outside the
law.
The moral right of integrity raises issues that are more
difficult to balance with copyright policy. The right is more
difficult to enforce than that of attribution since it requires
that the work be preserved in a pristine state. This demand
can place an undue burden on consumers' ability to use the
work. Due to the ease and speed with which documents can be
created and distributed, every user's potential to be an author
is increased dramatically. 4 ' The nets' interactive nature en-
courages users to add their own contributions to existing works
and to link other works together. An offensive addition would
be actionable in a jurisdiction that recognizes moral rights, if
the author could prove that the altered work harmed his or her
reputation."' Such harm is readily foreseeable when a user
could anonymously circulate the insulting material to a poten-
tial readership of millions. However, targeting violations of
authors' right of integrity would require detecting the culpable
user. Even assuming the feasibility of assigning identification
codes to each user, would-be copyright infringers could hardly
be expected to log on using their proper net-names. Similarly,
programming the network to reject users' additions to works
would enforce authors' rights at the expense of users' legiti-
mate interests.
To prioritize user access to the net's unique communica-
tions services, an author's consent for a work to appear on a
net could constitute an implied waiver of the right of integrity.
The waiver could be embodied in a contract with consideration
provided in exchange for abrogation of the right. Reputational
147. The phrase "desktop publishing" captures the user's ability to reach a
large audience. If freedom of the press truly applies only to those who own one,
widespread network access will facilitate democratic information exchange. See Jim
Louderback, The Internet Emerges as a Global Comm Link, PC WK., Sept. 27,
1993, at 100 (describing the Internet as a resource for human rights activists from
Kenyan doctors to Croatian government officials).
148. Berne Convention, supra note 9, art. 6bis(1), S. TREATY Doc. No. 27 at
41, 828 U.N.T.S. at 235.
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interests could still be enforced through actions for defamation
where an author armed with a backup copy of the unmodified
work and solid evidence of character harm could recover dam-
ages for the injury.'49 The possibility of money damages
would have a stronger deterrent effect on potential infringers
than the injunctive remedy allowed in a moral rights action.
Penalizing computer defamation would allow authors with
bona fide causes of action to assert their rights without prior
restraints on electronic speech.150 A contrary approach of al-
lowing injunctive relief would only diminish the available data-
bases, devaluing the networks' services and in turn depressing
the worth of the works they contain.'51 The enforcement of
these economic rights is a more immediate concern than
authors' moral rights in computer networks. While the Berne
Convention provides certain minimum standards, its guidelines
must be viewed in conjunction with the supreme law of the
European Union-the Treaties Establishing European Unity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Computer networks have been compared to the American
frontier in that they both fascinate Europeans with their ex-
pansionist lure and sometimes lawless ambiance.'52 As did
the physical frontier, the virtual terrain charted by the nets
contains rich resources. This potential must be exploited wisely
by governments providing legal guidance without burdening
the developing market. Now that the digital frontier is no
longer the province of one nation but the product of interna-
tional transactions, the European Union's socioeconomic struc-
ture allows a unique opportunity to set the standard for the
149. See, e.g., Kimberly Richards, Comment, Defamation Via Modern Communi-
cation: Can Countries Preserve Their Traditional Policies?, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 613
(1990) (comparing different elements of a prima facie cause of defamation under
American, British, and Canadian law).
150. The Treaty Establishing European Union does not contain an equivalent of
the American Constitution's First Amendment right to free speech and a free
press. However, a tradition of free speech has been present from the Community's
origins.
151. Networks operate on the theory that a new technology's value increases
proportionately with its users' ranks.
152. Bruce Sterling, Between the Lines, THE TIMES (London), Apr. 10, 1993,
Features Section, at 65 (commenting that "[ilike most frontiers, cyberspace is a
breeding ground for crime.").
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protection of intellectual property on the networks.
The ease with which digital works can be rerouted over
geographic borders and the lack of technological harmonization
within the Union should prompt reevaluation of sweeping
parallel import bans. While preservation of a free market is
critical to the nets' continued evolution, their inherent fluidity
contributes more to the flow of goods and services than any
government regulation. Directives and research initiatives
harmonizing member nations' technology should therefore
remain the Union's priority. As international standards
emerge, a more liberal view toward licensing that protects
authors' rights would further encourage investment in new
technologies. To this end, the European Court should reconsid-
er the Commission's view in the Magill cases. Authors' rights
themselves must also be restructured. The Berne Convention
must expand its definition of publication, while moral rights
other than attribution should be waived by uploading one's
work to a net. A digital collection society and related tracking
mechanisms should be built into the networks to ensure that
authors are rewarded for their efforts. Implementing these
measures will lay a strong foundation for the Union's emerging
technological and legal networks in the years to come.
Jenevra Georgini
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